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Changing distribution of migrant population and influencing factors in urban 
China: economic transition, public policy, and amenities 
 
Highlights: 
1. We examine the redistribution of the migrant population in urban China in the early 
2010s, compare the changes with those of the past decade, and study the underlying 
factors including economic transition, public policy and amenities. 
2. Migration is a tug-of-war not only between sectors and regions, but also between 
governments and between past and future. 
3. The growth rate of migrants declines in major cities, while several provincial 
capitals and lower-tier cities emerge as new migration destinations.  
3. The relative importance of the factors behind the redistribution of the migrant 
population varies greatly across regions and changes over time.  
4. The service industry has become a leading source of migrant jobs, while migrants 
skipping cities with large agricultural and manufacturing sectors.   
5. Rising housing prices and worsening air pollution have not deterred migrants.  
6. Except in largest cities, the effects of state interventions and migration controls on 





Changing distribution of migrant population and influencing factors in urban 
China: economic transition, public policy, and amenities 
Abstract: Rural-urban and interregional migration has greased the wheels of China’s 
labor market and fueled rapid urbanization. The spatial distribution of migrants has 
changed significantly in recent years. We create a panel of Chinese cities using 
decennial census and annual yearbook data, studying the distribution of migrants from 
2010 to 2016, comparing with prior years, and examining factors behind the changing 
spatial distribution. Results show that China’s maturing economy, coupled with 
shifting migration policy and migrants’ preferences, has affected the redistribution of 
migrants. The spatial agglomeration of migrants peaked in the early 2010s, so did the 
growth of migrants—signaling a major turning point of China’s urbanization. The 
slowdown is most evident in coastal mega-regions, while several interior provincial 
capitals and coastal lower-tier cities have emerged as new migration destinations. 
Industrial upgrading and restrictive migration rules have pushed migrants away, while 
strong economies and more public services have attracted migrants. However, air 
pollution and higher housing cost have not deterred migrants. Our findings highlight 
that, while institution factors and state interventions have greatly affected migration, 
their effects are diminishing in urban China except in largest cities. As the growth of 
productivity and population continues to slow, lower-tier cities can implement 
effective strategies to recruit migrants as part of their development plan.   
Key words: Migrant redistribution; rural-urban and interregional migration; urban 









1. Introduction  
Since 1978, rapid economic growth has transformed China from an agricultural 
economy to an industrialized and urbanized one, leading to an unprecedented surge in 
rural-urban and interregional migration (Sun and Fan 2011; Fan 1996).  With the 
reform of household registration (hukou) system and widening regional disparities, 
migrants have flocked to more-developed areas for better life (Zhu 2007; Fan 2005; 
Shen 2013).  The size of the migrant population has increased from 121 million in 
2000 to 221 and 247 million in 2010 and 2015 respectively1 (ONPSS 2017).  
Largest migration destinations include highly industrialized and urbanized mega-
regions, such as the Pearl River Delta (PRD), the Yangtze River Delta (YRD), and the 
Beijing-Tianjin regions (Y. Liu and Xu 2017; He et al. 2016).   
Migrants are a major force in China’s economic growth, contributing to 21% of 
annual GDP growth in the post-reform years (Cai and Wang 1999).  The migrant 
population made up about 35% of China’s total workforce in 2015—15 percentage 
points higher than its share of the Chinese pouplation (Freeman 2015).  Rural-urban 
migrants—agricutural hukou2 holders—made up 87% of the overall migrant 
 
1 We derive these data from the 2000 and 2010 decennial censuses and the 2015 one percent population survey, 
conducted by National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in China. We use NBS’s definition of migrant population, which 
refers to migrants whose residence is ‘inconsistent’ with their hukou registration (who do not have local household 
registration status) and who have lived in their migration destination for more than 6 months. The migrant 
population excludes short-distance migrants (those who moved within the same city or county) and short-term 
migrants (those who have lived in their migration destination for less than 6 months). According to NBS, 294 
million people were in the category of ‘residence-registration inconsistency’ in 2015. Of those, 247 million were 
part of the migrant population. 
2 There are two major aspects to the hukou system of China. One is the distinction between agricultural hukou and 
nonagricultural hukou. Nonagricultural hukou holders, who made up 29% of China’s population in 2010, live in 
cities (PCOSC and NBC 2012). In contrast, many agricultural hukou holders have disengaged from agricultural 
activities and moved to cities. The second aspect is the location of the hukou registration. Many major cities still 
heavily subsidize residents with local hukou registration (J. Liu 2018; Lin et al. 2019).   
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population in 2010 (PCOSC and NBC 2012).  Finally, migrants are vital for rural-
urban integration —a key policy goal of the Chinese central government (CPC and 
State Council 2014; Cai et al. 2018).   
There has been gradual, but significant, changes in China’s internal migration in 
recent years.  First, many coastal cities have begun to replace labor-intensive 
manufacturing activities with service and creative industries, reducing the demand for 
unskilled labor (Y. Liu and Shen 2017; Wu et al. 2018).  Second, rapidly increases in 
housing cost have affected migrants in major cities (Zang et al. 2015; Yu 2017).  
Third, the central government has given more controls of migration to cities, 
especially if the city’s urban population is above 3 million (J. Liu 2018).  
Meanwhile, cities have had diverging views on migrants. Tire-1 cities, such as 
Shanghai and Beijing, are increasingly hostile to unskilled migrants (Cheng et al. 
2014), while many lower-tier cities have become more accommodating.  Fourth, 
urban problems, such as air pollution and traffic congestions, appear to have made 
many top tier cities less attractive to migrants (Chen et al. 2013; S. Li et al. 2014).  
Fifth, second-generation and whole-family migrants, who make up a growing share of 
the migrant population, seem more concerned about social welfare and public services 
(Zhu and Chen 2010; Cheng et al. 2014).  
China’s internal migration and rapid urbanization have attracted much scholarly 
attention (S. Li 2004; He et al. 2016).  However, we know little about the changing 
spatial pattern of migrants and the relative importance of underlying factors since the 
early 2010s when the urban share of China’s population surpassed 50% for the first 
4 
 
time—a major turning point of China’s urbanization—and when economic transition 
gained momentum across the country.  
Given the importance of the migrant population in China, we aim to examine three 
interrelated research questions: (1) To what extent have the spatial distribution of the 
migrant population and migration destinations changed from 2010 to 2016, compared 
with the period from 2000 to 2010? (2) What factors are associated with the 
redistribution of migrants in recent years? (3) How has the relative importance of 
underlying factors varied across regions and changed over time?  
In the following sections, we review the literature, present our conceptual models, 
and discuss data and methodology used in this study.  Then, we report the changing 
spatial patterns of migrants and carry out a longitudinal analysis of factors behind the 
changing patterns.  Next, we examine the relationship between different types of 
cities and conduct a case study in two cities to cross-check our findings.  We draw 
conclusions and provide policy recommendations in the end. 
 
2. Literature review and conceptual framework  
2.1. Theoretical background 
Migration is essential to urbanization and economic development (S. Li 2004; Fan 
2005; De Haas 2010).  The literature suggests that internal migration is affected by 
uneven regional development, institutional transitions, and individual pursuits of 
better amenities and quality of life (Fan 1996; Vendryes 2011; Gupta 1993).  
In the neoclassical and behavioral views, people migrate to maximize utility or the 
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overall utility of their household.  The neoclassical approach emphasizes the roles of 
human capital, cost-effectiveness, and perceived risks in individual’s migration 
decision (Sjaastad 1962).  Everything else being equal, people migrate to places with 
more job opportunities, higher wages, and better living environment.  Meanwhile, 
the behavioral approach considers migration as a complex process of decision-making 
(Gurak and Kritz 2000).  Social networks and personal relations matter in migration 
decisions (Michaelides 2011).  Both the neoclassical and behavioral perspectives 
have paid relatively little attention to macro-economic and institutional factors, some 
of which are unique to China (Fan 2002). 
The structural method, grown from the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model (Lewis 1954; Ranis 
and Fei 1961), is another approach in the study of migration (Fan 1996).  
Researchers have highlighted the importance of labor market segmentation, uneven 
economic opportunities, and institutional context in migration (Fan 2002; Cai and 
Wang 2003).  Rural-urban migration is considered a tug-of-war between the 
agricultural and the industrial/services sectors of the country, energized by growing 
agricultural productivity and wage differentials between various sectors.  Rapid 
industrialization and urbanization in developed areas lead to more jobs and higher 
wages, which attract migrants from less-developed areas (Gupta 1993; Fan 2005).  
Furthermore, the structural approach has emphasized the role of institutional factors. 
State interventions have greatly affected internal migration in selected countries 
(Vendryes 2011; Chan and Zhang 1999).  
Recent studies have also highlighted the effects of urban amenities and public 
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services on migration (Y. Liu and Xu 2017; Cheng et al. 2014).  There has been a 
steady increase in “lifestyle” migration, by which the relatively affluent move for 
quality-of-life reasons instead of economic gains (Benson and Oreilly 2009) .  One 
example is that many retirees in the U.S. are moving to the Sunbelt region (McHugh 
and Mings 1991).  Finally, urban issues, including overcrowding and rising living 
costs, have pushed many migrants away from major cities (Yu and Myers 2007; 
Eimermann 2015).  
 
2.2. Migration research in transitional China  
A large body of literature has examined China’s internal migration and its 
determinants in the past forty years (Shen 2015; Liang et al. 2014; Y. Liu and Xu 
2017).  Three sets of factors distinguish China’s internal migration.  
The first set of factors are institutional changes and state interventions, which have 
greatly affected the mobility and distribution of migrants in China (L. Li et al. 2010; 
Shen 2013).  Institutional factors, such as the hukou system implemented in the 
1950s, severely curtailed internal migration (Chan and Buckingham 2008; Chan and 
Zhang 1999).  Later, China’s central government assigned millions of skilled 
workers and educated youths from coastal cities to the hinterland and rural areas.  
Overall, self-initiated mobility was very low from the 1950s to the 1970s (Y. Liu et al. 
2014).  Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has gradually relaxed its control 
over migration (Shen and Huang 2003; Zhu 2003).  There has been a massive 
increase in internal migration and the emergence of rural-urban migration—the 
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phenomenon of the floating population.  Since the early 2010s, the Resident Permit 
(juzhu zheng) system, which makes local hukou and amenities be more accessible for 
migrants, has gradually replaced the Temporary Resident Permit (zanzhu zheng) 
system and made it possible for migrants to gain permanent status in cities.  Since 
the announcement of the “Guidance on the Further Reform of the Hukou System” in 
2014, both central and local governments have been gradually phasing out the old 
hukou system (J. Liu 2018).  Because local governments have gained more control 
over migration policy, there has been growing regional differences in migration 
regulations since the early 2010s3(J. Liu 2018).  Institutional constraints still affect 
mobility (Chan and Buckingham 2008).  It is difficult, if not impossible, for semi-
/unskilled migrants—from either urban or rural sources—to “move” hukou to tier-1 
cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, and gain full access to public services in their 
migration destinations (Cheng et al. 2014).  The hukou location and, to a decreasing 
extent, the hukou status4 still determine one’s migration choice and life opportunity in 
China (L. Li et al. 2010).  
The second set of factors are uneven regional economic development and growing 
market forces (Fan 2005; Shen 2013).  China’s coastal regions improved their 
regional economy much more quickly than other parts of the country since the mid-
1980s, due to their locational and institutional advantages (Wei and Ye 2009; Liao and 
Wei 2015).  Meanwhile, agricultural productivity increased rapidly across the 
 
3 Please see Appendix for the requirements of household registration in cities of various urban population sizes.  
4 Please see Appendix for more information about the evolution of the hukou system and migration policies in 
China since 1949.  
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country and led to a large increase in surplus labor.  Coupled with the hukou reform, 
the rapid economic growth in the coastal regions, such as the PRD and the YRD 
regions, attracted massive migration from the less-developed hinterland regions 
(Zhong et al. 2013; Y. Liu et al. 2014).  However, since the early 2000s, the pace of 
economic development and urbanization has accelerated in China’s central and 
western regions because of an improved investment environment and the support of 
the central government.  While major cities with high productivity and wages are 
still appealing to migrants (Y. Liu and Xu 2017; Y. Liu and Shen 2017), many central 
and western cities have accelerated the pace of industrialization and adopted new 
policies to attract labor-intensive industries and unskilled migrants (He et al. 2016).  
In contrast, tier-1 cities, suffering from overcrowding and deteriorating quality-of-life, 
have pushed unskilled migrants away through industrial upgrading and migration 
regulations.  Migrants who had hard time in the major cities of the coastal region are 
steadily migrating or returning to China’s hinterland regions, generating new 
population agglomerations and leading to the geographic diversification of migration 
destinations (Liang et al. 2014).  
The third set of factors are related to changing demographics and shifting 
preferences of migrants.  China stands at a demographic turning point (Peng 2011).  
The one child policy implemented in the late 1970s has abruptly reduced the size of 
the subsequent birth cohorts (Banister 1987; Riley 2004; Zhao and Chen 2008).  
Each new birth cohort joining the rank of migrants is getting smaller over time.  
There is no longer a large pool of surplus laborers in rural China.  Moreover, most 
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new migrants grew up in one-child families.  Consequently, the newer generation of 
migrants is substantially different from older migrants with respect to their size and to 
their personal preferences.  As China’s economy matures and the standard of living 
improves, migrants seem to have paid more attention to amenities and lifestyle in their 
migration decisions (Wang 2011).  Furthermore, young and skilled migrants seem to 
prefer developed urban regions that have better amenities (Fan 2005; Cheng et al. 
2014; Y. Liu and Shen 2017).  Family migrants have also cared more about the 
quality and the accessibility of public services, such as children’s education and health 
care (Lin et al. 2019).  More recently, migrants in major cities are facing new 
challenges, such as rising housing cost, air pollution, and traffic congestion (Zang et 
al. 2015).  However, it is still unclear how these factors have affected the 
redistribution of migrants in China.  
 
2.3. Conceptual framework for migration redistribution across urban China  
Based on the literature review, we expect to see several push and pull forces that 
have affected the distribution of the migrant population across urban China.  Figure 
1 shows our conceptual framework of influencing factors on migration redistribution 
in the new era of China’s urbanization.  We focus on the role of economic transition, 
public policy, and urban amenities.  In addition to the several factors discussed in the 
literature review, we examine the following variables.     
(Figure 1. about here) 
First, the housing sector, a pillar of China’s urban economy, is closely linked to 
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China’s internal migration.  A strong local economy usually attracts migrants, which 
in turn elevates housing demand and attracts housing investment (Zang et al. 2015).  
Therefore, we expect to see that migrants are an important driver in the housing 
market and that housing investment—and housing prices—are positively associated 
with the growth of the migrant population.  
Second, social welfare and public services are linked to migration.  The migrant 
population should grow in cities with larger per capita public expenditure, which is 
also positively correlated with the quality of social welfare and public services.  
While migrants are often excluded from social welfare and public services in major 
cities, smaller cities tend to be more accommodating to migrants.   
Third, regional differences in amenities—such as children’s education, air 
pollution, and the availability of public transport—should also matter to migrants 
(Chen et al. 2013; Lin et al. 2019).  Rapid industrialization and urbanization have 
resulted in serious environmental pollution, which may have pushed migrants away 
from large and heavy industrial cities (Cai et al. 2018).   
To summarize, we expect to see that the growth of the migrant population is 
positively associated with local economies, job opportunities, the wage level, 
economic growth, social welfare and public services, housing investment and prices, 
the support of the central government, and better urban amenities.  In contrast, the 
migrant population should grow more slowly—or even decline—in cities with strong 




3. Data and methodologies 
3.1. Data sources 
The population data used in this study are derived from the two recent population 
censuses in 2000 and 2010, and from the 1% sample population survey in 2015.  We 
acquire the supplemental data (2011-2014, and 2016) from provincial and prefectural 
statistical yearbooks.  These data are collected by national and local statistics 
bureaus, which are the most reliable source of population and migration data in China.   
We build our contextual variables using data from the China City Statistical 
Yearbooks (CCSY).  
We define the migrant population (liudong renkou) as those who are residing in a 
city that is different from the city of their household registration (hukou) and who 
have stayed in the cities of destination for at least 6 months.  The size of the migrant 
population in each city equals to the difference between the size of the resident 
population—those who have lived in the city for more than 6 months—and the size of 
the registered population—those who have local hukou and have lived in the city for 
more than 6 months5.  
There are a total of 334 cities in this sample, which include 4 centrally administered 
municipalities, 35 provincial capitals and specifically-designated cities, 24 county-
level cities.  The rest are prefecture-level cities (Fig. 2).  In addition, we separately 
study major cities, which are centrally administered municipalities, provincial 
capitals, and specially-designed cities.  There are a total of 63 major cities in this 
 
5 Temporary migrants—those who have stayed in the current location for less than 6 months—are 
excluded from this study.  
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study.  There have been minor administrative changes to the boundary of the cities 
during our study period.  We have slightly adjusted the boundary of the cities to 
make the data more comparable over time.  
(Figure 2. about here) 
3.2. Methodologies 
3.2.1. Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) 
In this study, we apply the ESDA techniques to examine the spatial heterogeneity 
and dependence of China’s internal migration based on our spatial dataset.  The 
Global Morans I statistic (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) is employed to measure the spatial autocorrelation of 
the distribution of the migrant population across urban China.  The 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 can be 
calculated by the following equation:    
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑛𝑛∗∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹����)�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗−𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹�����𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1
�∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 �∗∑ (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹����)2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1   (1) 
where, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 and 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗  stand for the amount of the migrant population in sample city 𝑖𝑖 
and 𝑗𝑗, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹���� is the average amount of the migrant population by city.  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 represents 
the spatial weight matrix, and 𝑛𝑛 is the number of sample cities.  The value of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 
ranges from -1 to 1, significantly positive 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 value indicates spatial agglomeration 
and autocorrelation of the feature. 
We also use the Hot Spot Analysis tool, namely the estimation of the Getis-Ord Gi* 
statistic (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖∗), to explore the spatial clusters of the growth of the migrant population.  
To be a statistically significant hot (cold) spot, a feature will have a high (low) value 
and be surrounded by other features with high (low) values as well. The 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖∗ can be 




∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1
��𝑛𝑛∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗2 −�∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 �2𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 �
𝑛𝑛−1
𝑆𝑆
  (2) 
where, 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 is the annual growth of the migrant population for city 𝑗𝑗, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is the 
spatial weight matrix. 𝑛𝑛 stands for the number of sample cities, and:  
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1
𝑛𝑛




  (4) 
 
3.2.2. Empirical models and variable specifications 
We also study the relative importance of factors that have affected the distribution 
of the migrant population across urban China since 2010.  We build the following 
conceptual model: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = F(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1)  (5) 
where 𝑖𝑖 means the sample cities, 𝑡𝑡 is the study period. 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is the dependent 
variable, which represents the size of the migrant population in each sample city.  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 represent independent variables related to economic transition, 
public policy, and urban amenities respectively.  
Table 1 reports the details of the independent variables used in this study.  
Researchers have considered the wage level and job opportunities as proxies for 
regional economic development (Y. Liu and Shen 2014).  We use per capita gross 
domestic product (PGDP), the number of employed people (EMPL), and the average 
wage of the employed (WAGE) to measure the level of economic development by 
city.  We follow previous studies and use annual growth rate of GDP (RGDP), and 
industrial composition (i.e. PRIM, SECO and TERT) to represent the level of 
14 
 
economic transition by city.  Since 1980, China’s agricultural productivity has 
increased significantly, and its share of the economy has steadily declined.  In fact, 
the service industry has become the largest sector for employment in many major 
cities.  Moreover, we use the annual housing investment (HOUSE) to measure the 
level of housing development by city.  Housing prices by city are studied in the 
robustness check.  
  Based on the literature and our conceptual framework, regional differences in 
migration regulations should have played an important role in the redistribution of the 
migrant population across urban China.  We introduce two dummy variables—
STATE and HUKOU—as the proxies for state interventions and local migration 
controls respectively.  Cities with better social welfare and public services are 
expected to attract more migrants.  Meanwhile, cities that face large financial 
pressure should be less attractive.  We use per capita public expenditure (EXPEN) 
and the amount of fiscal deficit (PRESS) as the proxies of social welfare services and 
financial pressure by city respectively. 
  Urban amenities perhaps have increasingly affected China’s internal migration in 
recent years, as a new generation of migrants is paying more attention to the quality of 
life than older generations (Y. Liu and Xu 2017).  Based on the literature, we use 
health care, children’s education, public transport, and leisure service data to measure 
the level of public services by city (Y. Liu and Shen 2014).  People have in recent 
years paid more attention to air quality in China, and governments have implemented 
various strategies, such as “Livable City” and “Garden City”, to improve air quality 
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and living environment.  We use the level of air pollution (AIR_P) and the 
availability of urban green space (GREEN) to measure the environmental conditions 
by city.  Table 1 provides detailed information about the variables used in this study.   
(Table 1. about here) 
  A panel regression model is used to examine the extent to which various factors 
have impacted the distribution of the migrant population.  We use the first-lagged 
value of independent variables to control for the potential problem of multicollinearity 
and endogeneity.  Table 2 shows the basic descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in this analysis.  In order to make a consistent comparison, we standardize the data 
for analysis. 
(Table 2. about here) 
 
4. Changing distribution of the migrant population across urban China 
4.1. Spatiotemporal patterns of the migrant population 
Figures 3 and 4 show the changing spatial patterns of migrants by mapping the size 
of the migrant population by city and the ratio of in-/out-migration to the registered 
population by city in 2000, 2010, and 2016.  Positive (negative) values indicate 
whether a given city is gaining or losing the migrant population.  Clearly, the 
migrant population was moving to tier-1 cities (i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen) at the beginning of the 21st century.  Subsequently, the central 
government adopted national policies such as “Support Xinjiang and Tibet”, “Western 
Development”, and “Northeast Promotion” to support the less-developed regions of 
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China.  As a result, many autonomous regions in western China had a slight increase 
in the migrant population.  In contrast, lower-tier cities around the coastal mega-
regions (i.e. the PRD, the YRD, and the Beijing-Tianjin regions) lost migrants from 
2000 to 2010.  Except for provincial capitals, most cities in central China also lost 
population to out-migration.  However, there was no dramatic exodus from any 
given city—no cities lost more than 1 million or more than 10% of its local 
population over the decade.   
There has been a significant redistribution of the migrant population since 2010.  
First, coastal mega-regions emerged as the main migration destinations, which had a 
net gain of more than 10% (up to 100%) of the migrant population.  Cities, each of 
which had more than 5 million migrants in 2016, include Shanghai, Beijing, 
Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Dongguan.  Second, provincial capitals, especially in central 
and western China, have attracted migrants.  The migrant population has exceeded 1 
million in several tier-2 cities such as Chengdu, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, and Kunming.  
Third, most cities in the hinterland regions and around the mega-regions lost 
population to out migration.  Low-tier cities located in Guizhou, Guangxi, eastern 
Sichuan, southern Henan, western Fujian, northern Jiangsu, and northern Guangdong 
lost more than 20% of their local population.  Moreover, the net gain of migrants in 
resource-based regions, such as Xinjiang and northeastern China, has slowed down.  
(Figures 3 and 4. about here) 
Table 3 reports the changes of global Morans I index es, which are significantly 
positive, from 2000 to 2016.  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 indexes kept rising from 2000 to 2010, indicating 
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that the migrant population was increasingly concentrated in the selected destinations.  
In contrast, the decline of the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 indexes from 2010 to 2016 suggests not only the 
geographical dispersion of the migrant population, but also the reordering of 
migration destinations.  In other words, the migrant population is dispersing to more 
cities and to different cities in this new era of China’s urbanization.  
 (Table 3. about here) 
4.2. Spatial restructuring of migration destinations 
Figure 5 shows the clusters of migration destinations (origins) based on the relative 
increase (or decrease) of the migrant population.  From 2000 to 2010, hot spots were 
in three mega-regions, namely the PRD, the YRD, and Beijing-Tianjin regions, which 
were the most popular destinations for migrants.  In each of the three mega-regions, 
the size of the migrant population increased by more than 0.2 million per year from 
2000 to 2010.  In contrast, cold spots are mainly seen in central and western China, 
such as Chongqing, Sichuan, and Henan.  Some lower-tier cities located in less-
developed regions experienced a steady loss of population.  
The spatial pattern of migration destinations and origins changed from 2010 and 
2016.  The hotspot analysis shows that the Beijing-Tianjin region still had a high 
average annual growth of in-migration from 2010 to 2016.  Meanwhile, hot spots 
have shifted somewhat from coastal to inland regions.  Specifically, many lower-tier 
cities in the PRD and the YRD regions had a decrease in the average annual growth of 
the migrant population, while several interior cities (e.g. Chongqing) witnessed a 
slight increase in the migrant population.  On the other hand, cold spots are mainly 
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located in central and southwestern China (e.g. Henan, Guizhou, and Guangxi), where 
population has continuously declined.   
Next, we look at the changes in growth, comparing the average annual growth rate 
of the migrant population by city during the two periods, namely 2000-2010 and 
2010-2016.  The results shown in Figure 4c confirm the spatial restructuring of 
migration destinations in China since 2010.  First, cold spots are largely in the PRD, 
the YRD, and the Beijing-Tianjin regions.  Compared with the period from 2000 to 
2010, the average annual growth of the migrant population during the period from 
2010 to 2016 significantly slowed in these mega-regions.  In particular, the migrant 
population declined by 154,000 and 26,000 in Beijing and Shanghai respectively from 
2015 to 2016.  Second, hot spots are shown in northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and 
the upper-middle reaches of the Yangtze River—areas that used to send out large 
numbers of migrants.  We also find that several inland cities, such as Chongqing, 
have slowed down the pace of population decline since 2010.  Several inland 
provincial capitals emerged as new migration destinations.  Third, several lower-tier 
cities in Inner Mongolia and northeast China had a decline in population likely due to 
fertility decline, resource exhaustion, and economic stagnation.  
(Figure 5. about here) 
 
5. Driving forces and mechanisms of the migrant population redistribution 
5.1. The overall picture of the driving mechanisms  
After the descriptive analysis shown above, we conduct a panel regression analysis 
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to study factors behind the redistribution of the migrant population across urban China 
from 2010 to 2016.   Table 4 shows the regression results.  We first report the 
results for all sample cities and then for major cities only.  Independent variables 
with higher Pearson’s correlation values are put into the models separately (see 
Models 1-3).  The coefficients for PGDP, EMPL and WAGE are significantly 
positive in all sample cities, indicating that the size of the migrant population is 
positively associated with strong local economies.  This finding is consistent with 
the neoclassical view that places with more jobs and higher wages are attractive to 
migrants (Michaelides 2011; Y. Liu and Xu 2017).  However, the coefficients of 
IGDP are significantly negative, suggesting that migrants are moving away from 
cities with higher rate of economic growth.  Many lower-tier cities, where the growth 
rate of GDP was high between 2010 and 2016, had a net loss of migrants to more 
developed cities.  This finding is consistent with the structural explanation that 
uneven economic opportunities matter a great deal to migrants.  
Our results indicate that industrial upgrading has affected the redistribution of the 
migrant population.  The coefficients of PRIM are negative and statistically 
significant, showing that cities with a large agricultural sector tend to have a large out-
migration.  This result is consistent with a recent study that examined the effects of 
rising agricultural productivity on migration (Yang et al. 2016).  While SECO has a 
negative sign, the coefficient of TERT is positive.  The migrant population is 
growing in major cities whose economy is largely service based.  Cities with a larger 
service sector tend to have more jobs suitable for migrants.  Meanwhile, 
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industrial/resource-based cities that have pursued industrial upgrading pushed away 
low-end manufacturers and unskilled migrants.  Furthermore, the coefficients for 
HOUSE are significantly positive, implying that housing investment is positively 
associated with the growth of the migrant population.  Rural-urban migration has led 
to a growth in housing demand and investment in the migration destinations.   
Different from our expectations, STATE has a negative sign, suggesting that 
migrants have not congregated in cities located in the National Priority Zones.  
Meanwhile, the coefficient of HUKOU is significantly positive, suggesting that cities 
with strong migration controls have still seen an increase in the migrant population.  
There are three possible explanations for this counterintuitive finding.  First, major 
cities that have a large and growing migrant population are more likely to restrict 
migration in their effort to deal with overcrowding.  Second, migration controls may 
have become ineffective outside tier-1 cities.  It also takes time for migration 
controls to take effect and to affect in-migration.  Third, for migrants, the lure of jobs 
and opportunities outweighs the effect of migration controls in major cities.  
Migration controls may have pushed away unskilled migrants and increased job 
vacancies in the short run.  Wage levels will eventually increase, and more migrants 
will be attracted to the city until an equilibrium is reached.  In sum, state 
interventions and institutional factors have greatly affected migration in China but 
may become less effective in the future.   
EXPEN and PRESS have positive and negative signs, respectively.  This means 
that cities with higher expenditures on social welfare have attracted more migrants.  
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In contrast, cities with a large public debt have attracted fewer migrants.  These are 
consistent with what we have originally thought.  
In addition, most coefficients for amenity variables are significantly positive.  
This suggests that migrants prefer places with abundant social welfare and public 
services.  Although public services have improved across urban China, high-quality 
public resources are still concentrated in major cities.  In addition, air pollution 
(AIR_P) has a significant and positive sign, which is unexpected.  Migrants seem 
impervious to air pollution.  Since the overwhelming majority of migrants are from 
rural China and they go to cities for jobs and opportunities, air pollution appears to be 
a secondary concern.  
In the second stage of the analysis, we focus on major cities only.  The regression 
results show several notable differences from those of the full sample.  First, the 
coefficients of PGDP and EMPL become negative or no longer statistically 
significant.  Major cities tend to have similarly high levels of economic 
development; migrants may not choose one major city over another based on the level 
of economic development.  Furthermore, industrial upgrading has led to changing 
labor demand in major cities, where local governments have favored skilled migrants 
over the unskilled.  Second, the coefficients for STATE and HUKOU are not 
statistically significant, indicating that the effects of national and local policies vary 
across major cities.  The designation of National Priority Zones matters more to 
major cities than to smaller cities with respect to migration.  On the other hand, tier-
1 cities such as Beijing and Shanghai have implemented some of the most stringent 
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migrant controls to deflect unskilled migrants.  Migrant regulations are less effective 
outside these tier 1 cities.  Third, amenity variables such as DOCT, EDU, and 
GREEN are no longer statistically significant.  This is probably because rising living 
costs in major cities have washed out the positive effects of amenities and quality 
services for migrants.   
(Table 4. about here) 
For major cities, the coefficient for the housing investment variable is still 
significantly positive.  To further understand the relationship, we plot the bivariate 
relationship between changes in the migrant population and housing prices in major 
cities where housing price data are more reliable and readily available (see Figure 6).  
The result shows a positive correlation between the two: the growth of the migrant 
population is larger in cities where housing prices have increased more.  In other 
words, migration remains an important driver of the housing market in this new era of 
China’s urbanization.  However, there are exceptions.  Tier-1 cities saw a large 
increase in housing prices with little or no corresponding growth of migrants.  These 
cities have the most stringent migration controls in China (S. Li et al. 2014).  Even 
though these cities have pushed migrants away, housing demand remains very high.  
The bigger potential for asset appreciation has attracted much housing investment to 
tier 1 cities.  In contrast, migrants are more likely to make compromises such as 
living in crowded and substandard conditions than local residents (Yu 2017).  
Overall, rising housing cost has not deterred migrants in major cities so far.   
(Figure 6. about here) 
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5.2. Regional disparities in the driving mechanisms  
  We separately carry out the analysis in eastern and in central-western China.  The 
results reported in Table 5 show large regional differences in factors underlying the 
redistribution of the migrant population.  First, the coefficients for EMPL and 
WAGE vary between regions.  The size of the migrant population is larger in eastern 
cities that have more jobs and higher wages.  In contrast, these relationships are 
either muted or negative in central-western China.  This is perhaps because the levels 
of economic development are relatively homogenous among less developed cities.  
Moreover, some less-developed autonomous regions have attracted migration, 
probably due to state interventions.  Overall, these results confirm existing findings 
that China’s eastward migration is the result of uneven regional economic 
development.    
Second, the effects of state intervention (STATE) and financial pressure (PRESS) 
vary between regions.  The coefficients for STATE are significantly negative for 
eastern cities, but positive for central-western cities.  This is perhaps because most 
national policies have focused on supporting less-developed interior regions.  
Therefore, the impacts of state interventions are more apparent for inland cities.  
Meanwhile, the coefficients of PRESS have the opposite signs in these two areas.  
Surprisingly, the size of migrant population is positively associated with the level of 
financial pressure in eastern cities.   
  Third, the coefficients for some amenity variables differ between regions.  In the 
group of central-western cities, the coefficients for EXPEN, DOCT and LEIS are 
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significantly positive.  This signifies that the quality of social welfare and public 
services plays a role in attracting migrants.  However, the same variables are either 
negative or insignificant for eastern cities, suggesting that the influences of public 
services are relatively muted in more developed areas.  In addition, the coefficients 
for GREEN are negative among central-western cities.  This finding is different from 
our original hypothesis that migrants tend to move to places with better amenities.  
Again, this result shows that amenities are largely a secondary concern for migrants.  
(Table 5. about here) 
5.3. A case study of two cities 
  We further conduct a case study to examine the changes of migrant flows and their 
driving forces in two cities, namely Beijing—a tier-1 city located in the coastal mega-
region and the capital city of China—and Nanchang—a less-developed provincial 
capital located in central China.  Figures 7 and 8 respectively show changes in the 
migrant population and economic structure in these two cities.  As one of the most 
popular migration destinations in China, Beijing had net gains of more than 8 million 
migrants from 2010 to 2016.  However, the growth rate has steadily declined in 
recent years.  This is highly associated with the changes in the economic structure 
and migrant policies of Beijing.  To reduce congestions and housing cost, the central 
and local governments plan to relocate all non-essential functions (e.g. low-end 
manufacturing facilities and specialized wholesale markets) from Beijing to 
neighboring cities.  Meanwhile, the producer services and high-tech sectors have 
become industry leaders in Beijing (see Figure 8).  There has also been a decrease in 
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the demand for unskilled migrants.  As one of the most regulated cities in China, it is 
nearly impossible for unskilled migrants to gain local hukou and become Beijing 
residents.  Without local hukou, migrants do not have access to much of the public 
service in Beijing.  At the same time, housing prices have kept rising in Beijing.  
Consequently, the number of migrants has declined in Beijing for the first time in 
recent memory.     
In contrast, the migrant population has kept increasing in Nanchang from 2011 to 
2016.  Although the local government has been pursuing industrial upgrading, 
manufacturing industries and low-end services still dominate the local economy.  
There have been more job opportunities for migrants.  For instance, the number of 
jobs in the industrial sector increased by 414,500 in Nanchang from 2011 to 2016.  
As part of the recent hukou reform, the central and local governments have largely 
abolished the old household registration system in cities like Nanchang.  It is 
relatively easy for migrants to acquire local hukou and gain access to social welfare in 
Nanchang.  Furthermore, Nanchang has adopted preferential policies to attract 
skilled migrants.  Coupled with a relatively cost of living and a high quality of life, 
abundant job opportunities and the ease of migration have attracted many migrants to 
Nanchang in recent years.   
(Figures 7 and 8 about here) 
 
6. Conclusion 
  Although there is an extensive literature on China’s internal migration, we know 
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little about the redistribution of the migrant population and its underlying factors since 
2010.  This study attempts to fill this gap.  We look at the changing distributions of 
the migrant population over time and examine the effects of push and pull factors 
related to economic transition, public policy, and urban amenities.  We also compare 
different regions and carry out a case study to check the robustness of our findings.  
  The result illustrates that the migrant population was highly concentrated in the 
mega-regions, such as the PRD, the YRD and Beijing-Tianjin regions, as well as 
many provincial capitals before 2010.  In contrast, Chongqing—the newest direct-
administered municipality—and lower-tier cities in the hinterland (e.g. Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Henan) lost large populations to out-migration.  Our findings are consistent 
with that of the literature (Shen 2013; Y. Liu et al. 2014).  
From 2010 to 2016, there has been a significant redistribution of the migrant 
population.  The growth of the migrant population significantly slowed in coastal 
mega-regions.  While stringent migration controls have pushed migrants away from 
tier-1 cities, major cities remain very attractive to migrants.  Many lower-tier cities 
located in central and western China have reversed the trend of population decline 
and, in some cases, had a modest increase in the migrant population.  Several interior 
provincial capitals and lower-tier cities have emerged as new migration destinations.   
Furthermore, resource-based cities, mostly located in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and 
northeastern China, have had a steady decline in the migrant population.  These 
results illustrate the spatial restructuring of migration destinations in China since 
2010.   
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  Our regression results show that the interactions between push and pull factors have 
resulted in the ebb and flow of the migrant population and that the relative importance 
of the influencing factors has differed across regions/cities and changed over time.  
As expected, regional differences in economic development, job opportunities, and 
wages are still the main driving forces behind China’s internal migration.  Migrants 
are skipping cities with a large agricultural sector or a declining industrial sector.  
Consistent with the literature, cities with better—and more accessible—amenities are 
attractive to migrants.  The amenity effect is more salient in less-developed regions.  
State interventions, such as national projects and regional development plans, have 
had positive, but modest, impacts on population agglomeration among major cities.  
It is unclear whether such impacts will be long lasting.  Finally, cities that have large 
debt obligations are less attractive to migrants, especially in less-developed regions. 
We also have several unexpected findings.  First, the service industry has largely 
replaced manufacturing in major cities and become the leading attraction for migrants.  
This is in contrast with some past studies which show that manufacturing expansion 
in urban areas has brought in migrants as cheap laborers (He et al. 2016).  Industrial 
upgrading has reached its limit in tier-1 cities.  It would be difficult for major cities 
with a large service sector to pursue industrial upgrading as a way to deflect migrants.  
Second, we find that a booming housing market, characterized by increasing housing 
investment and rising housing prices, has not deterred migrants.  Except for tier-1 
cities which have implemented stringent migration controls and deflected unskilled 
migrants, the growth of the migrant population is positively associated with the 
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increase in housing investment and prices.  Migrants are perhaps primarily 
concerned about jobs and opportunities with the associated income.  Third, except 
for tier-1 cities in recent years, there is a positive association between local migration 
controls and the spatial agglomeration of migrants.  Despite migration controls and 
restrictive local hukou, people are still migrating to large cities.  The hukou reform 
will likely continue to diminish the power of governments to regulate migration.  
Fourth, the level of air pollution is positively associated with the growth of the 
migrant population.  Even though urban residents have complained much about air 
pollution in recent years, air pollution seems a secondary concern for migrants.  
Finally, the growth of the migrant population is negatively associated with the 
increase in GDP.  Because of large disparities between cities, economic growth alone 
is not enough to keep migrants from moving to major cities.  
  All in all, our study has uncovered temporal and spatial redistribution of the 
migrant population across urban China and factors behind the redistribution since 
2010—a new era of China’s economic development and urbanization.  Migration has 
been a tug-of-war not only between sectors and cities, but also between governments 
and between past and future.  In the coming years, the growth of productivity and 
population will continue to slow.  Migrants will have more choices in terms of 
migration destinations.  As the migration rules become more relaxed outside tier-1 
cities, there will likely be more urban migrants who seek better opportunities and 
living environment in other cities.  Future research should pay more attention to 





  There are several policy implications.  From the perspective of the government, 
institutional reform and population regulations should be tailored to specific regions 
to promote regional integration and productivity.  Interior cities with growing 
economic opportunities and relatively low costs of living have the potential to attract 
more migrants.  Meanwhile, nationally and regionally central cities that want to 
attract skilled migrants can focus on industrial upgrading and fine-tuning population 
regulations.  An important question confronting major cities is how to help migrants 
adapt to urban life and alleviate economic and social discrepancies between local 
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Note: Positive (negative) values in these figures indicate the net inflow (outflow) of population, 
and the net population inflow means the increase of the migrant population at the city level. 
 
Figure 4. The ratio of the in/out-migrant population to the local population across urban 





*The local population refers to those who have local hukou in the city of their residence and stayed 
there for more than 6 months. Local residents in urban areas rarely move between cities.  
Figure 5. Hot/cold spots of the average annual growth of the migrant population by city:  





Figure 6. The bivariate relationship between the changes of the migrant population and 
housing prices in major cities  
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Table 1. The description of the independent variables and the expected effects 





Per capita (resident population) gross domestic product by city. (10,000 yuan) PGDP + 
Employment 
opportunities 
The number of employed (year-end) by city. (10,000) EMPL + 
Wage levels  Average annual wage of employed workers by city. (10,000 yuan) WAGE + 
Economic growth  Annual GDP growth by city. (%) IGDP +/- 
Industrial upgrading  Changing industrial structure by city, which is calculated by the share of primary, 






Housing investment by city—the ratio of annual total investment (both public and 
private) in housing development relative to the total land area of city’s administrative 




State intervention  Dummy variable. 1 for cities located in the national prioritized zone, and 0 for cities 
outside the zone. The central government of China defines the priority zone as the 




Dummy variable. 1 for cities that have implemented special migration regulations 
such as the “points-based hukou system (jifen luohu)”.     
HUKOU - 
Social welfare Per capita (resident population) public expenditure by city. (yuan) EXPEN + 
Governmental 
financial pressure  
The amount of fiscal deficit by city. (100 million yuan)  PRESS - 
Amenities  
Health service The number of qualified doctors per 10,000 residents by city.  DOCT + 
Children education The number of teachers in middle and primary schools per 1,000 residents by city EDU + 
Public transport The number of public transportation vehicles per 10,000 residents by city  BUS + 
Leisure service The number of cinemas and theaters per million residents by city LEIS + 
Air pollution  Air pollution intensity—the ratio of the total emission of industrial sulfur dioxide 
and dust to the total land area of city’s administrative region. (10,000 ton per km2) 
AIR_P - 






Table 2. Summary statistics for dependent and independent variables in regression models 
Variables  N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FP 1395 -0.44  132.08  -410.80  986.99  
PGDP 1395 4.26  2.99 0.53  22.45  
EMPL 1395 54.68  82.52  5.01  954.34  
WAGE 1395 4.04  1.08  1.38  10.34  
IGDP 1395 11.53  3.82  -19.38  25.10  
PRIM 1395 12.96  8.11  0.03  49.89  
SECO 1395 50.80  10.44  16.09  89.75  
TERT 1395 36.24  9.11  9.76  77.95  
HOUSE 1395 2.07  3.61  0.01  36.57  
EXPEN 1395 6388.12  3,279.11  1,609.42  42,912.39  
PRESS 1395 98.39 9.96  0.00  2,673.87  
DOCT 1395 19.88  7.57  6.11  108.92  
EDU 1395 2.88 1.81 0.21 18.19 
BUS 1395 8.19 9.25 0.32 225.5 
LEIS 1395 3.69 3.60 0.15 51.22 
AIR_P 1395 3.75  8.28  0.02  254.94  
GREEN 1395 39.11  7.64 6.75  71.81  
Note: Two dummy variables (i.e. STATE and HUKOU) are excluded in this table.  
 
Table 3. The global Morans I in 2000, 2010 and 2016 
 2000 2010 2016 
Morans I  0.304*** 0.330*** 0.289*** 
E (I) -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0028 
Z Score 15.512 16.274 13.562 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 





Table 4. Regression results for all sample cities and major cities only, 2011-2016 
Variables All sample cities Major cities Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Constant 0.344*** 0.197*** 0.310*** 1.021*** 0.682*** 0.581*** 
Economic 
transition 
PGDP 0.294***   0.031   
EMPL 0.334***   -0.049   
WAGE 0.114*** 0.169***  0.916*** 0.708***  
IGDP -0.038** -0.057*** -0.067*** -0.087* -0.081* -0.094** 
PRIM  -0.131*** -0.225***  -0.201*** -0.311*** 
SECO -0.124***  -0.183*** -0.204***  -0.468*** 
TERT  0.198***   0.373***  
HOUSE   0.488***   0.258*** 
Public 
policy 
STATE -0.106*** -0.179***  0.006 0.090  
HUKOU  0.830***   0.046  
EXPEN   0.212***   0.444*** 
PRESS  -0.073*** -0.085***  -0.092*** -0.099*** 
Amenities 
DOCT 0.009 0.013 0.028* -0.013 -0.090*** -0.012 
EDU 0.095*** 0.036*  -0.081* -0.251***  
BUS 0.173*** 0.203*** 0.078*** 0.342*** 0.298*** 0.120*** 
LEIS 0.029 0.056*** 0.037** -0.018 -0.024 0.003 
AIR_P 0.036** 0.012 0.014 0.176*** 0.121*** 0.107*** 
GREEN 0.146*** 0.115*** 0.102*** -0.663* -0.032 -0.025 
Observation 1674 1674 1674 210 210 210 
Adjusted R2 0.566 0.535 0.635 0.782 0.834 0.840 
F statistic 129.2*** 108.0*** 171.8*** 45.1*** 59.3*** 65.9*** 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 55 cities that did not report complete demographic data are excluded in 




Table 5. Regression results for cities in eastern and central-western China, 2011-2016 
Variables Eastern China Central-western China Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Constant 0.322*** 0.432*** 0.237*** -0.022 -0.167** 0.206*** 
Economic 
transition 
PGDP 0.100***   0.255***   
EMPL 0.635***   -0.181***   
WAGE 0.191*** 0.496***  0.009 -0.020  
IGDP -0.045** -0.055** -0.049** -0.023 -0.025 -0.038 
PRIM  -0.149*** -0.358***  -0.180*** -0.361*** 
SECO 0.021  -0.177*** -0.132***  -0.273*** 
TERT  0.154***   0.147***  
HOUSE   0.490***   0.226*** 
Public 
policy 
STATE -0.139*** -0.153***  0.392*** 0.178***  
HUKOU  0.361***   0.902***  
EXPEN   0.013   0.209*** 
PRESS  0.127*** 0.190***  -0.456*** -0.412*** 
Amenities 
DOCT -0.127*** -0.153*** -0.034 0.172*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
EDU 0.125*** 0.029  0.146*** 0.048***  
BUS 0.176*** 0.246*** 0.092*** 0.130*** 0.061** 0.053** 
LEIS -0.030* -0.016 0.024 0.050* 0.076*** 0.040 
AIR_P 0.026 0.016 0.030 0.034 0.005 0.002 
GREEN 0.187*** 0.124*** 0.119*** 0.015 -0.005 -0.012 
Observation 606 606 606 1068 1068 1068 
Adjusted R2 0.847 0.741 0.733 0.315 0.494 0.512 
F statistic 198.2*** 97.2*** 98.6*** 29.8*** 58.8*** 66.8*** 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 55 cities that did not report complete demographic data during 2011 to 
2016 are excluded in this regression analysis. Eastern China includes Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, and Hainan. Central-western China includes Chongqing, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Shannxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. 
 
Appendix 1 The evolutionary of hukou system and migration policies in China since 1949 
Period Year Key events and policies 
From 1949 to 
mid-1950s: 
migrant freely 
1949 “Common Program of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference”, article 5: People have the right of free migration. 
1951 “Interim regulations on urban household register (hukou) management” has been issued by Ministry of Public Security of the PRC to ensure people’s safety, and their free residence and migration. 
1954 The people’s right of residence and migration freedom was stipulated by “Constitution of the PRC”. 
From mid-1950s 
to late 1970s: 
migration was 
tightly controlled 
by the national 
policies 
1956 “Circular on preventing the blind outflow of rural population” was issued by the State Council of the PRC. 
1958 “Regulations on household registration of the PRC” was issued by the National Peoples Congress of the PRC, rural-urban migration was rigidly restricted due to the urban-rural dual hukou system. 
1964 “Provisions on handling hukou migration” was issued by the State Council of the PRC.  
1960s-
1970s 
Due to the so-called ‘Third Front Projects’ and the ‘Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside’ movement millions of 
skilled workers, educated youths had migrated to the less-developed internal regions.  
1977 The transfer of hukou from agricultural to non-agricultural (nong zhuan fei) was increasingly restricted. 
From 1978 to the 
early 2010s: the 
incremental 




The restrictions on the transfer of hukou from agricultural to non-agricultural were gradually relaxed, especially for the rural-
urban educated youths and skilled worker’s relatives. 
1985 
“Provisional regulations on the management of urban temporary resident population” and “Regulations of the PRC on the on the 
identity card of residents” were issued, rural-urban immigrants should apply for the temporary-residential permit (zanzhu zheng), 
and these policies have confirmed the legitimacy of migration. 
1992 The “local town resident hukou (lanying hukou)” system was implemented in small-towns, special economic zones and development zones, indicating that the reform of hukou system was featured by spatial differences in China. 
2001 “Suggestions on promoting the reform of hukou system in small towns”, which was formulated by the Ministry of Public Security, was approved by the State Council of the PRC.  
2001-
2010 
Some provinces, metropolises and small and medium-sized cities started to explore the reform of hukou system, such as the 
implement of points-based hukou system (i.e. jifen luohu) in the main metropolises.  
2011 “Notice on actively and steadily promoting the reform of the household registration system” was issued by the State Council of the PRC, and the residential permit (juzhu zheng) system was implemented in some cities.  
From 2014: 
comprehensively 
deepen the reform 
of hukou system 
2014 “Opinions on further promoting the reform of the hukou system”, and “National Plan on New Urbanization” were issued by of the State Council of the PRC.  
2014-
2016 
The implementation plans of the further reform of hukou system had introduced by 31 provinces, the distinction between 
agricultural and non-agricultural hukou will be abolished.  
2016 
“Interim regulation on residential permits” was implemented by the State Council, migrants who hold the permits could apply 
for the local hukou according to the requirements for household registration in each specific city. Only cities with more than 3 
million population in urban area could implement points-based hukou system.   
 
Appendix 2 The requirements for household registration in cities with different urban population size 
Category The requirements for household registration 
Cities or designated towns with less than 0.5 
million resident population in urban area 
Migrants who have stable residence could apply for 
local hukou. 
Cities with 0.5 to 1 million resident 
population in urban area 
Migrants who have stable jobs and residence, 
participate in urban social insurance system, and 
stayed in the city for a certain number of years 
(usually less than 3 years), could apply for local 
hukou.  




1 to 3 million resident 
population in urban area 
Migrants who have stable jobs and residence, 
participate in urban social insurance system, and 
stayed in the city for a certain number of years 
(usually less than 5 years), could apply for local 
hukou.  
3 to 5 million resident 
population in urban area 
Local governments could make specific 
requirements based on migrants’ age, job and 
residence. Local governments could implement 
points-based hukou system (i.e. jifen luohu). 
Cities with more than 5 million resident 
population in urban area 
Implement the points-based hukou system based on 
several criteria, such as migrants’ age, jobs, 
residence, and education attainment. 
Note: Information derived from the“Interim regulation on residence permits”, which was implemented by the State Council of PRC. 
 
 
 
